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INTRODUCTION (Section 1) 
 
The combination of increasing water scarcity and fiscal 
discipline has intensified the search for methods that 
increase the efficiency of water use.  One method in 
particular that has received considerable attention in 
both theory and practice is the institution of interdistrict 
water trading.  It is generally assumed that water trading 
can correct the inefficiencies of historically or 
politically determined water entitlements by equalizing 
the marginal value of water across districts. 
 
We show in this paper that the simplifying assumptions 
under which water trading achieves efficient water 
allocation are rather severe.  In a more realistic setting, a 
water authority is needed to establish rules and 
standards such that trading can achieve and sustain an 
efficient outcome. 
 
In particular, we investigate the complicating role that 
space and time have on optimal water allocation rules.  
In a model where water transport is not costless, water 
at different locations have different values in the 
efficient solution.  Similarly, when water storage is 
feasible but not costless (e.g. when groundwater is 
among the important sources of water) the spatial 
allocation problem is neither separable across periods 
nor does the intertemporal allocation problem have a 
simple and obvious solution.  Finally, transportation 
cost functions may be non-linear in distance and 
volume: in addition, such functions might be 
discontinuous as well.  
 
This paper discusses these complicating factors in a 
realistic setting involving two water districts on the 
Island of Oahu, Hawaii.  The two districts are separated 
by a natural barrier but supplied by a common source.  
In addition to the shared source, one district has 
groundwater while the other has its own surface water 
supplies.  Over time, the efficient solution involves 
changes in the allocation of the common water source. 
In our example, the efficient allocation involves first 
allocating all of the common water to the groundwater 
district, then sharing the water between the two districts, 
and finally, allocating the common water to the surface 
water district. It is only when the common source is 
shared that the marginal valuation of water is equalized 
across the two districts, after allowance for 
transportation costs. 
 
Section 2 below reviews the principles of efficient 
allocation over space and time.  Section 3 provides 
principles for a more general model and applies them to 
the Hawaii case.  Section 4 summarizes the primary 
principles for efficient inter-district allocation and 
provides concluding remarks regarding alternative 
institutions for approximating that solution.  
 
EFFICIENT SPATIAL AND INTERTEMPORAL 
WATER ALLOCATION (Section 2) 
 
Principles of Efficient Spatial Allocation (Section 2.1) 
 
Suppose there is a single source of surface water (e.g. a 
diversion dam) and several users at different locations.  
The marginal cost of water at the headworks is just the 
cost of operating the facility to let an additional unit of 
water flow out (possibly negligible) plus the user cost 
(rent plus interest plus depreciation) of the additional 
headworks capacity needed for that marginal unit.  
Efficient water allocation to a user adjacent to the 
headworks requires that this marginal cost of water 
equal the marginal benefit to the user. If the user is a 
farmer, for example, the marginal benefit is the value of 
the additional product that the marginal unit of water 
provides. 
 
The marginal cost of water at a more distant location is 
the marginal cost of “producing” the water (as above) 
plus the marginal cost of transporting the water from the 
headworks to the user.  The transport cost in turn is the 
user cost of the additional conveyance capacity needed 
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to transport the marginal unit of water plus the value of 
water lost in conveyance (e.g. through evaporation, 
seepage, and percolation).  Ideally, conveyance 
structures are designed to minimize transportation costs 
such that the marginal cost of reducing conveyance 
losses by one unit is equal to the marginal benefit of the 
water thus saved.  In summary, efficient allocation 
requires setting the net marginal benefit at each location 
in the water distribution system, after deducting the 
marginal transportation cost, to the marginal cost of 
providing water at the headworks of the system.1 
 
We define the marginal cost at the headworks as the 
“system efficiency price” and the gross marginal benefit 
(before deducting transport costs) as the locational 
efficiency price. The efficiency conditions stated above 
imply that the locational efficiency prices differ by the 
transportation cost between locations and that the 
system efficiency price is the locational efficiency price 
at the headworks. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates optimal allocation of surface water 
for two sub-districts.  One sub-district is at the 
headworks and requires no transportation costs.  The 
other is more distant with commensurate costs.  Curves 
D1 and D2 are the net water demand curves for sub-
districts 1 and 2 after deducting transport costs. The 
curve DD is the combined demand of the two sub-
districts and S is the (inelastic) supply of surface water.  
The efficiency price is P*, where the combined demand 
curve intersects the total supply curve S.  Here, q1 and 
q2 give the optimal allocation for each respective 
subdistrict, and are the levels at which the respective 
inverse demand in each subdistrict is equal to the price 
P*. 
 
P
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Figure 1:  Efficient allocation across space  
 
There are a number of institutional mechanisms for 
achieving, or at least approximating, efficient allocation.  
To the extent that information about marginal benefits is 
decentralized, decentralized mechanisms of water 
allocation, especially water pricing and water trading, 
are thought to be preferable to centralized mechanisms 
such as water rationing.  Water pricing will achieve 
efficient allocation if the marginal price for each user is 
set equal to the locational efficiency price at the user’s 
location.  Intramarginal prices need not be so set.  For 
example, the water authority may attain both efficiency 
and equity through block pricing, the simplest form of 
which is to charge nothing for an amount judged to be a 
necessity2 and the locational efficiency price for all 
subsequent units.  This simple pricing scheme achieves 
both efficiency and progressivity in the sense that the 
average price increases with the amount of water 
consumed. 
 
If there are substantial non-linearities in production and 
transport costs, however, then marginal costs are 
dependent on the quantities consumed, which the water 
authority may not be able to accurately estimate without 
knowing the marginal benefit schedules for its (possibly 
diverse) clientele.  This problem may be largely 
overcome over time, through a combination of 
estimation and observation of quantities consumed. 
 
A less informationally-demanding institution is water 
trading.  The water authority approximates entitlements 
consistent with efficiency and equity.  Trading then 
restores efficiency without decreasing equity.  But since 
water at different locations is not equally valuable, the 
authority needs to set appropriate trading rules and 
standards.  Suppose, for example, that water is 
conveyed in pipes and that leakage is negligible.  In that 
case, trading can be conducted on a one-for-one basis 
across different locations, and water users can be 
required to pay for transport costs in addition to what 
they pay for the water entitlement itself.  To take the 
other polar extreme, suppose that transport costs consist 
entirely of conveyance losses.  In this case, trading can 
be conducted in terms of “gross” water (i.e. water at the 
headworks).  Users are then entitled to receive their 
allocated amount of gross water minus the conveyance 
losses involved.  Alternatively, trading can be 
conducted in terms of water received but the authority 
establishes exchange rates that achieve the same result.  
In general, if either or both types of transport costs are 
present, the authority can set exchange rates as given by 
the ratios of appropriate locational efficiency prices. 
 
 
Principles of Efficient Intertemporal Allocation: the 
Case of Groundwater (Section 2.2) 
 
In the case of groundwater (and no surface water), the 
full marginal cost of water equals the marginal 
extraction cost (including the user cost of construction 
of the well etc.) and the marginal user cost of depleting 
the groundwater resource.  The latter consists of the loss 
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in present value associated with extracting a unit of 
water now instead of later.  One such loss is the 
decrease in present value from forgoing the capital gains 
that would have accrued from conserving the unit.  The 
other is the loss in present value from having to extract 
water from deeper in the well.   
 
A major source of Honolulu water supply is the Pearl 
Harbor Aquifer. In that case the marginal user cost is 
roughly four times the marginal extraction cost (i.e. the 
full marginal cost or system efficiency price is five 
times the marginal extraction cost).3 
 
In Figure 2, demand increases from Dt1 in period 1 to 
Dt2 in period 2, and total marginal cost increases from 
TMCt1 in period 1 to TMCt2 in period 2.  Figure 2 
illustrates optimal extraction from a groundwater source 
in two periods.  Because of the upward (but not vertical) 
slope of the total marginal cost curve and because of the 
tendency of demand to increase more than the total 
marginal cost from one period to the next, the efficiency 
price may increase less than in the surface water case.  
This tendency plays an important role in the Hawaii 
simulations to follow.   
 
Figure 2:  Efficient allocation across time 
 
 
In a case like that depicted in Figure 2, water trading 
can be rendered efficient by allowing forward 
contracting.  This is equivalent to setting exchange rates 
for water in different periods according to the ratio of 
efficiency prices (full marginal costs) across periods.   
 
Conjunctive Use With Spatially-Equivalent Sources 
(Section 2.3) 
 
Now suppose that a water district has two locationally 
equivalent sources – one surface water source and one 
groundwater source.  The efficiency conditions are just 
those of section 2.1 with the additional condition that 
the full marginal cost of providing water from both 
sources is equal.  This case readily generalizes to more 
than two sources. 
 
 
 
Unrestricted Interdistrict Allocation (Section 2.4) 
 
Next consider the case of two districts, each with its 
own source.  To illustrate the principles involved and to 
facilitate the transition to the Hawaii application, we 
assume that district 1 is sourced by groundwater and 
that district 2 is sourced by surface water.  Intradistrict 
transport costs are assumed to be zero. 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the optimal allocation for two sub-
cases.  The water demand curve in district 1 is labeled 
D1 and the demand curve in district 2 is labeled D2.  
Likewise, the respective total marginal cost (TMC) 
curves, or supply, for each district are labeled S1 and S2. 
In the first sub-case, interdistrict transport costs are 
prohibitively expensive. In such a case the optimal 
solution is given by the intersection of each district’s 
demand curve with its own TMC curve. Note that 
efficiency price (at the intersection point) in district 1 is 
higher than that of district 2, although this may change 
if the demand for water is growing.   
 
For the second subcase, assume that interdistrict 
transport costs are zero.  Total demand DD is given by 
the horizontal sum of district 1 and district 2 demand 
curves.  Total marginal cost, or supply, is given by the 
sum of groundwater S1 and surface water S2 supplies 
from the two districts, and is represented by ST.  In the 
case shown, S2 – q2 units of water are shipped from 
district 2 to district 1 in order to achieve the requirement 
that the efficiency prices be equal (to P*) in both 
districts. 
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Figure 3: Efficient conjunctive use without conveyance 
costs  
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Towards a More General Model of Efficient 
Intertemporal and Spatial Allocation (Section 3) 
 
Spatial equivalence among sources facilitates a 
relatively simple solution.  In effect, one can subtract 
the fixed quantity of surface water from demand, unify 
the various groundwater sources according the principle 
of equalizing the full marginal cost across wells, and 
then solve the problem as if there is a single 
groundwater source.  When spatial equivalence does not 
hold (i.e. when sources are at different locations) we 
lose this separability between supply and demand.  
Moreover, there is no reason to expect that water be 
fungible across the entire system.  Rather, the optimal 
solution is likely to exhibit spatial separability between 
districts, where different districts have different system 
efficiency prices.  However, the boundaries of these 
districts are in general unknowable without doing the 
optimization exercise. 
 
The Hawaii example discussed in this section illustrates 
some of the complexities that can arise. Our discussion 
is framed in the more general water allocation problem 
described in the introduction. A water authority 
manages water for two districts (sources of demand) and 
has four water sources. Demand in each district grows 
over time, possibly at different rates. Each district has 
its own source of water and they can share a third 
source. The first district has rechargeable groundwater 
while the other district has surface water. The shared 
source is surface water. The fourth source comes from 
desalination, which serves as a backstop technology. 
Desalination is used only when the system efficiency 
price of water in a district rises to the desalination cost.  
 
Efficient allocation now requires interdistrict efficiency 
as well as intradistrict efficiency.  The latter requires 
that the marginal benefit at each location and at each 
time be equal to the locational efficiency price at the 
corresponding time.  Interdistrict efficiency in a 
particular period requires either that the system 
efficiency prices are equal across districts or that the 
prices are different and that all of the common source 
water is allocated to the higher-priced district  (See 
Smith and Roumasset 1999). Solving for the optimal 
solution in this case is not obvious.  One cannot, for 
example, choose an allocation of common source water, 
solve for the intradistrict optimal use of water then 
iterate on the original allocation according to which 
district has the higher efficiency price.  In general, the 
optimal allocation of common source water will itself 
change over time. 
 
Assuming equal and constant marginal water transport 
costs, the optimal solution for the Oahu case is 
illustrated in Figures 4 and 5.  Figure 4 shows the 
optimal sharing rule for the common water source, and 
Figure 5 shows the optimal water pricing rule for water 
in each district over time. For the first eight years, the 
full cost of producing water from the groundwater 
district is so much higher than the surface water district 
that even allocating all of the aqueduct water to the 
former leaves the system efficiency price of district 1 
higher than that of district 2.  But the growth of demand 
in the face of an inelastic supply causes the system 
efficiency price in district two to rise faster than that in 
district one (see Figure 5).  Eventually, water prices in 
the two districts are equal and some of  
 
 
Figure 4. Declining share of common-source water 
allocated to the groundwater district 
 
the common source water is allocated to the second 
district. The amount of the shared resource received by 
the second district increases until eventually it receives 
all of the shared water. Once the second district receives 
the entire amount of the shared source, water prices then 
begin to diverge, with district two prices higher than 
district one prices. This process continues until both 
sides adopt the backstop technology.  
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Figure 5. Efficiency prices over time 
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This example shows the potential problem inherent in 
sharing rules that are constant over time (e.g., deciding 
each district gets half of the shared water source each 
year). This is especially true if the districts are not 
allowed to trade their water allocations. 
 
The solution described in Figures 4 and 5 can be 
implemented by water prices or by trading.  In the case 
of pricing, a central water authority is needed to 
establish pricing schedules (e.g. block pricing) that 
conform to the time-denoted locational efficiency prices 
established in the optimal solution.  Alternatively, the 
central authority can facilitate the same solution via 
trading by extending the locational exchange rates 
discussed in section 2.1 to inter-district trades.  Under 
conditions of full information, the two mechanisms will 
achieve the same allocation.  Trading has the usual 
advantage under conditions of imperfect information in 
that the market can correct mistakes in the initial 
allocation.  Suppose, for example, that the Water 
Commission allocates the aqueduct water to the two 
districts on a 50-50 basis, regardless of the year.  This 
will result in district 1buying water rights from district 2 
before 2021 and vice versa from 2022 on. 
 
 
Summary and Concluding Remarks (Section 4) 
 
The central principle for efficient allocation of water 
over space is to take water from the abundant district 
and give it to the scarce district until the scarcity values 
or efficiency prices are equalized.  Where water is 
fungible over time, as in the case of groundwater or 
conjunctive use, water should be conserved to that 
extent which maximizes the present value of the water 
resources.  That implies that the efficiency price should 
be allowed to rise, albeit somewhat slower than the 
prevailing interest rate.  Where intra and inter-district 
costs of conveyance are significant, these should be 
deducted from the gross marginal benefits of water.   
 
Section 3 illustrated the case of asymmetrical transport 
costs with quantity restrictions.  In this case, the 
efficient solution may involve an internal optimum, 
such that efficiency prices are equal across districts; or a 
“corner solution,” such that the districts are managed 
independently, one with efficiency prices than the other. 
 
Note that the interdistrict efficiency conditions require 
that the district-level conditions are also being satisfied.  
For example, the principle of equalizing efficiency 
prices across districts (where feasible) requires that 
mechanisms for achieving intradistrict efficiency 
regarding spatial allocation and conjunctive use are in 
place. 
 
As a final caveat, note that despite the prominence of 
“efficiency prices” in the forgoing discussion, all of the 
allocation rules refer to quantities of water.  Actual 
prices are not required in the mechanism chosen to 
implement the efficiency rules.  It is imaginable that 
water quantities could be centrally chosen so as to 
achieve the requisite equalities of efficiency prices 
without ever having used prices in practice.  Whether or 
not this is advisable, depends on how knowledgeable a 
central water authority may be regarding the 
idiosyncratic benefits of individual users.  But even the 
commitment to a decentralized mechanism does not 
require charging everyone the marginal cost of water for 
every unit of water used.  As discussed in the various 
sections above, other mechanisms such as block pricing 
and water trading can also be used to achieve the 
efficient quantity allocations.   
 
But none of these institutional mechanisms, however 
“market-based,” is capable of implementing the 
efficient solution without actually exercising an 
algorithm such as the one described here.  A unit of 
water in one time period and at one location is not 
identical to that in another and cannot be traded as such.  
In order to facilitate efficient water trading, a water 
authority is still needed to establish exchange rates that 
create equivalencies between units of water in different 
times and different places according to the minimum 
cost of transporting water across space and the financial 
opportunity cost of “transporting” water across time.  In 
some cases, these exchange rates are independent and 
can be announced a priori.  In other cases, the exchange 
rates themselves depend on the optimal solution, 
necessitating the simulation exercise before the rates 
can be announced.     
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ENDNOTES 
                                                 
1 See e.g. Chakravorty and Roumasset (1988) and 
Chakravorty et. al. (1995) for formalizations of this 
problem. 
 
2 For example, 160 gallons per day per household of 
four persons. 
 
3 See Krulce et. al. (1997) for the formal model and an 
application to the Pearl Harbor Aquifer.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
